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ARGUMENT 
Contravention Of Its Plain Language 
The district court denied restitution for the salary of the prosecutor under 
I.C. § 37-2732(k) based on the finding that the state suffered no "economic loss" 
because the "prosecutor's salary would have been paid whether or not work was 
done in this case." (R., p. 105.) To show economic loss, the court reasoned, the 
state would have to prove that the case was not "routine" or that the prosecutor's 
efforts were not "part of the general expense of maintaining a system of courts." 
(R., pp. 105-06.) Because the district court required proof of elements not within 
the statute, it erred both as a matter of law and as an exercise of discretion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 3-6.) 
On appeal Harer first argues the district court did not deny restitution for 
the salary of the prosecutor because this was a routine case, but instead held 
the state had not met its "burden of proof" to show that the restitution was for 
"economic loss caused by [Harer's] conduct." (Respondent's brief, p. 8-16. 1) 
Harer's invitation for this Court to read the district court's opinion contrary to its 
1 Harer's argument is internally inconsistent. Although generally claiming that the 
district court was not limiting the scope of I.C. § 37-2732(k), he points out that 
the district court relied on State v. Hanson, 92 Idaho 665, 448 P.2d 758 (1968), 
in which the Idaho Supreme Court limited the scope of I.C. § 19-4703 (repealed). 
In that case the Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that the statute, which provided 
for the award of the cost of trial, should not be construed to include the cost of 
providing a jury because "jury costs are a general expense of maintaining the 
system of courts." !5t at 668-69, 448 P.2d at 761-62. The district court's 
reliance on Hanson is further evidence that the district court below was limiting 
the scope of the statute. 
1 
is 2 
105-06.) Because the district court's decision it 
salaries to non-routine cases limits the application of I.C. § 37-2732(k) in a 
manner incompatible with legislative intent as shown by the plain language of the 
statute, the district court erred. 
Harer next argues as an "alternative analysis" that the prosecutor's time 
was not necessarily spent on this case because there was a companion case 
dismissed as part of the plea agreement. (Respondent's brief, pp. 17-20.) This 
argument depends on a factual finding-that all of the time requested was in fact 
spent on a different case-that was not made by the district court. Although this 
Court should affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal 
analysis by applying the correct legal analysis, Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 
21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001), it may not affirm a trial court by making alternate 
factual findings, In re City of Shelley, 151 Idaho 289,294,255 P.3d 1175, 1180 
(201 O); Sherry v. Sherry, 111 Idaho 185, 186, 722 P.2d 494, 495 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
2 Harer believes that the state's request for ieversal and remand to apply the 
correct legal standards somehow supports his argument. (Respondent's brief, 
pp. 11-12.) Vacating the district court's order and remanding to apply the correct 
legal standards would also be a perfectly proper remedy, however. 
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it as 
costs of prosecution in routine drug cases. ing 
prosecutor salaries as restitution in "routine" drug cases is contrary to the 
language of I.C. § 37-2732(k). Because the district court's analysis is 
incompatible with the scope of the statute, the district court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to reverse or, in the alternative, to vacate 
the district court's Decision on Restitution and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2016. 
KENNETH K. JORQENS · N 
Deputy Attorney General 
3 Harer bases his factual claims supporting his alternate argument on the 
nonsensical theory that such facts must be assumed because they are not 
shown by the record. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.) It is axiomatic that the 
appellate court will not presume error and the party alleging error has the burden 
of showing it on the record. See,~' Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 
P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004). The state, as appellant, is not claiming any error by the 
district court in interpreting the scope of the restitution agreement, and therefore 
had no burden of establishing such in the record. Harer has cited no authority 
holding that the respondent may construct an alternate theory not supporled by 
the district courl's factual findings and then claim the appellant had the burden of 
anticipating and refuting such an alternate theory on record. 
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